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PENALTY-REGULATED DYNAMICS
AND ROBUST LEARNING PROCEDURES IN GAMES
PIERRE COUCHENEY, BRUNO GAUJAL, AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS
Abstract. Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N -person games,
we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a
replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of
the game’s strategy space repelling. These penalty-regulated dynamics are
equivalent to players keeping an exponentially discounted aggregate of their
on-going payoffs and then using a smooth best response to pick an action based
on these performance scores. Owing to this inherent duality, the proposed
dynamics satisfy a variant of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory
and they converge to (arbitrarily precise) approximations of Nash equilibria in
potential games. Motivated by applications to traffic engineering, we exploit
this duality further to design a discrete-time, payoff-based learning algorithm
which retains these convergence properties and only requires players to observe
their in-game payoffs: moreover, the algorithm remains robust in the presence
of stochastic perturbations and observation errors, and it does not require any
synchronization between players.
1. Introduction
Owing to the computational complexity of Nash equilibria and related game-
theoretic solution concepts, algorithms and processes for learning in games have
received considerable attention over the last two decades. Such procedures can be
divided into two broad categories, depending on whether they evolve in continuous
or discrete time: the former class includes the numerous dynamics for learning and
evolution (see e.g. Sandholm [34] for a recent survey), whereas the latter focuses on
learning algorithms (such as fictitious play and its variants) for infinitely iterated
games – for an overview, see Fudenberg and Levine [11] and references therein.
A key challenge in these endeavors is that it is often unreasonable to assume that
players can monitor the strategies of their opponents – or even calculate the payoffs
of actions that they did not play. As a result, much of the literature on learning
in games focuses on payoff-based schemes that only require players to observe the
stream of their in-game payoffs: for instance, the regret-matching procedure of Hart
and Mas-Colell [12, 13] converges to the set of correlated equilibria (in an empirical,
time-average sense), whereas the trial-and-error process of Young [42] guarantees
with high probability that players will spend a large proportion of their time near
a pure Nash equilibrium (provided that such an equilibrium exists).
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insightful suggestions, and to M. Bravo and R. Cominetti for many helpful discussions and remarks.
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In this paper, we focus on a reinforcement learning framework in which play-
ers score their actions over time based on their observed payoffs and they then
employ a smooth best response map (such as logit choice) to determine their ac-
tions at the next instance of play. Learning mechanisms of this kind have been
investigated in continuous time by Börgers and Sarin [5], Rustichini [33], Hopkins
[17], Hopkins and Posch [18], Tuyls et al. [39] and many others: Hopkins [17] in
particular showed that in 2-player games, the continuous-time dynamics that corre-
spond to this learning process may be seen as a variant of the replicator dynamics
with an extra penaly term that keeps players from attaining the boundary of the
game’s strategy space (see also Hopkins and Posch [18]). On the other hand, from
a discrete-time viewpoint, Leslie and Collins [24] used a Q-learning approach to
establish the convergence of the resulting learning algorithm in 2-player games un-
der minimal information assumptions; in a similar vein, Cominetti et al. [9] and
Bravo [7] took a moving-average approach for scoring actions in general N -player
games and provided sufficient convergence conditions for the resulting dynamics.
Interestingly, in all these cases, when the learning process converges, it converges
to a so-called quantal response equilibrium (QRE) which is a fixed point of a per-
turbed best response correspondence – as opposed to the standard notion of Nash
equilibrium which is a fixed point of the unperturbed best response map; see e.g.
McKelvey and Palfrey [27].
Discrete-time processes of this kind are usually analyzed by means of stochastic
approximation (SA) techniques that are used to compare the long-term behavior of
the discrete-time process to the corresponding mean-field dynamics in continuous
time – for a comprehensive introduction to the subject, see e.g. Benaïm [3] and
Borkar [6]. Indeed, there are several conditions which guarantee that a discrete-
time process and its continuous counterpart both converge to the same sets, so
continuous dynamics are usually derived as the limit of (possibly random) discrete-
time processes – cf. the aforementioned works by Leslie and Collins [24], Cominetti
et al. [9] and Bravo [7].
Contrary to this approach, we descend from the continuous to the discrete and
we develop two different learning processes from the same dynamical system (the
actual algorithm depends crucially on whether we look at the evolution of the play-
ers’ strategies or the performance scores of their actions). Accordingly, the first
contribution of our paper is to derive a class of penalty-regulated game dynamics
consisting of a replicator-like drift plus a penalty term that keeps players from
approaching the boundary of the state space. These dynamics are equivalent to
players scoring their actions by comparing their exponentially discounted cumula-
tive payoffs over time and then using a smooth best response to pick an action;
as such, the class of penalty-regulated dynamics that we consider constitutes the
strategy-space counterpart of the Q-learning dynamics of Leslie and Collins [24],
Hopkins [17] and Tuyls et al. [39]. Thanks to this link to the replicator dynamics,
the dynamics converge to quantal response equilibria in potential games, and we
also establish a variant of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer
and Sigmund [15]). In particular, we show the dynamics’ stability and convergence
depends crucially on the discount factor used by the players to score their strategies
over time: in the undiscounted case, strict Nash equilibria are the only attracting
states, just as in the replicator equation; on the other hand, for positive discount
factors, only QRE that are close to strict equilibria remain asymptotically stable.
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The second contribution of our paper concerns the implementation of these dy-
namics as a learning algorithm with the following desirable properties:
(1) The learning process is distributed and stateless: players update their
strategies using only their observed in-game payoffs and no further knowl-
edge.
(2) The algorithm retains its convergence properties even if the players’ obser-
vations are subject to stochastic perturbations and observation errors (or
even if they are not up-to-date).
(3) Updates need not be synchronized – there is no need for a global timer used
by all players.
These desiderata are key for the design of robust, decentralized optimization pro-
tocols in network and traffic engineering, but they also pose significant challenges.
Nonetheless, by combining the long-term properties of the continuous-time dynam-
ics with stochastic approximation techniques, we show that players converge to ar-
bitrarily precise approximations of strict Nash equilibria whenever the game admits
a potential function (cf. Theorem 4.4 and Proposition 4.6). Thus, thanks to the
congestion characterization of such games (Monderer and Shapley [30]), we obtain
a distributed robust optimization method for a wide class of engineering problems,
ranging from traffic routing to wireless communications – see e.g. Altman et al. [1],
Mertikopoulos et al. [28] and references therein.
1.1. Paper outline and structure. After a few preliminaries, our analysis proper
begins in Section 2 where we introduce our cumulative reinforcement learning
scheme and derive the associated penalty-regulated dynamics. Owing to the duality
between the players’ mixed strategies and the performance scores of their actions
(measured by an exponentially discounted aggregate of past payoffs), we obtain two
equivalent formulations: the score-based equation (PRL) and the strategy-based
dynamics (PD). In Section 3, we exploit this interplay to derive the long-term
convergence properties of the dynamics; finally, Section 4 is devoted to the dis-
cretization of the dynamics (PRL) and (PD) and their implementation as bona fide
learning algorithms.
1.2. Notational conventions. If S = {sα}nα=0 is a finite set, the real space
spanned by S will be denoted by RS and its canonical basis by {es}s∈S. To avoid
drowning in a morass of indices, we will make no distinction between s ∈ S and
the corresponding basis vector es of RS, and we will frequently use the index α to
refer interchangeably to either sα or eα (writing e.g. xα instead of xsα). Likewise,
if {Sk}k∈K is a finite family of finite sets indexed by k ∈ K, we will use the short-
hands (αk;α−k) for the tuple (. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ) ∈
∏
k Sk and we will write∑k
α instead of
∑
α∈Sk .
The set ∆(S) of probability measures on S will be identified with the unit n-
dimensional simplex ∆(S) ≡ {x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0} of RS. Finally,
regarding players and their actions, we will follow the original convention of Nash
and employ Latin indices (k, `, . . . ) for players, while keeping Greek ones (α, β, . . . )
for their actions (pure strategies); also, unless otherwise mentioned, we will use
α, β, . . . , for indices that start at 0, and µ, ν, . . . , for those which start at 1.
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1.3. Definitions from game theory. A finite game G ≡ G(N,A, u) will be a
tuple consisting of a) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; b) a finite set Ak
of actions (or pure strategies) for each player k ∈ N; and c) the players’ payoff
functions uk : A → R, where A ≡
∏
k Ak denotes the game’s action space, i.e. the
set of all action profiles (α1, . . . , αN ), αk ∈ Ak. A restriction of G will then be a
game G′ ≡ G′(N,A′, u′) with the same players as G, each with a subset A′k ⊆ Ak
of their original actions, and with payoff functions u′k ≡ uk|A′ suitably restricted
to the reduced action space A′ =
∏
k A
′
k of G
′.
Of course, players can mix their actions by taking probability distributions xk =
(xkα)α∈Ak ∈ ∆(Ak) over their action sets Ak. In that case, their expected payoffs
will be
uk(x) =
∑1
α1
· · ·
∑N
αN
uk(α1, . . . , αN )x1,α1 · · · xN,αN , (1.1)
where x = (x1, . . . , xN ) denotes the players’ strategy profile and uk(α1, . . . , αN )
is the payoff to player k in the (pure) action profile (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ A;1 more
explicitly, if player k plays the pure strategy α ∈ Ak, we will use the notation
ukα(x) ≡ uk(α;x−k) = uk(x1, . . . , α, . . . , xN ). In this mixed context, the strategy
space of player k will be the simplex Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) while the strategy space of the
game will be the convex polytope X ≡∏k Xk. Together with the players’ (expected)
payoff functions uk : X→ R, the tuple (N,X, u) will be called the mixed extension of
G and it will also be denoted by G (relying on context to resolve any ambiguities).
The most prominent solution concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium
(NE) which characterizes profiles that are resilient against unilateral deviations;
formally, q ∈ X will be a Nash equilibrium of G when
uk(xk; q−k) ≤ uk(q) for all xk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ N. (NE)
In particular, if (NE) is strict for all xk ∈ Xk \ {qk}, k ∈ N, q will be called a strict
Nash equilibrium; finally, a restricted equilibrium of G will be a Nash equilibrium
of a restriction G′ of G.
An especially relevant class of finite games is obtained when the players’ payoff
functions satisfy the potential property :
ukα(x)− ukβ(x) = U(α;x−k)− U(β;x−k) (1.2)
for some (necessarily) multilinear function U : X → R. When this is the case,
the game will be called a potential game with potential function U , and as is well
known, the pure Nash equilibria of G will be precisely the vertices of X that are
local maximizers of U (Monderer and Shapley [30]).
2. Reinforcement learning and penalty-regulated dynamics
Our goal in this section will be to derive a class of learning dynamics based on
the following reinforcement premise: agents keep a long-term “performance score”
for each of their actions and they then use a smooth best response to map these
scores to strategies and continue playing. Accordingly, our analysis will comprise
two components:
(1) The assessment stage (Section 2.1) describes the precise way with which
players aggregate past payoff information in order to update their actions’
performance scores.
1Recall that we will be using α for both elements α ∈ Ak and basis vectors eα ∈ ∆(Ak), so
there is no clash of notation between payoffs to pure and mixed strategies.
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(2) The choice stage (Section 2.2) then details how these scores are used to
select a mixed strategy.
For simplicity, we will work here in continuous time and we will assume that
players can observe (or otherwise calculate) the payoffs of all their actions in a
given strategy profile; the descent from continuous to discrete time and the effect
of imperfect information will be explored in Section 4.
2.1. The assessment stage: aggregation of past information. The aggrega-
tion scheme that we will consider is the familiar exponential discounting model:
ykα(t) =
∫ t
0
λt−sukα(x(s)) ds, (2.1)
where λ ∈ (0,∞) is the model’s discount rate, x(s) ∈ X is the players’ strategy
profile at time s and we are assuming for the moment that the model is initially
unbiased, i.e. y(0) = 0. Clearly then:
(1) For λ ∈ (0, 1) the model assigns exponentially more weight to more recent
observations.
(2) If λ = 1 all past instances are treated uniformly – e.g. as in Rustichini
[33], Hofbauer et al. [16], Sorin [37], Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [29] and
many others.
(3) For λ > 1, the scheme (2.1) instead assigns exponentially more weight to
older instances.
With this in mind, differentiating (2.1) readily yields
y˙kα = ukα − Tykα, (2.2)
where
T ≡ log(1/λ) (2.3)
represents the discount rate of the performance assessement scheme (2.1). In tune
with our previous discussion, the standard exponential discounting regime λ ∈ (0, 1)
corresponds to positive T > 0, a discount rate of 0 means that past information is
not penalized in favor of more recent observations, while T < 0 means that past
observations are reinforced in favor of more recent ones.
Remark 1. Leslie and Collins [24] and Tuyls et al. [39] examined the aggregation
scheme (2.2) from a quite different viewpoint, namely as the continuous-time limit
of the Q-learning estimator
ykα(n+ 1) = ykα(n) + γn+1 (ukα(x(n))− ykα(n))× 1(αk(n+ 1) = α)P (αk(n+ 1) = α | Fn) , (2.4)
where 1 and P denote respectively the indicator and probability of player k choosing
α ∈ Ak at time n+ 1 given the history Fn of the process up to time n, while γn is
a variable step-size with
∑
n γn = +∞ and
∑
n γ
2
n < +∞ (see also Fudenberg and
Levine [11]). The exact interplay between (2.2) and (2.4) will be explored in detail
in Section 4; for now, we simply note that (2.2) can be interpreted both as a model
of discounting past information and also as a moving Q-average.
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Remark 2. We should also note here the relation between (2.4) and the moving
average estimator of Cominetti et al. [9] that omits the factor P (αk(n+ 1) = α | Fn)
(or the similar estimator of Bravo [7] which has a state-dependent step size). As a
result of this difference, the mean-field dynamics of Cominetti et al. [9] are scaled by
xkα, leading to the adjusted dynamics y˙kα = xkα (ukα − ykα). Given this difference
in form, there is essentially no overlap between our results and those of Cominetti
et al. [9], but we will endeavor to draw analogies with their results wherever possible.
2.2. The choice stage: smooth best responses. Having established the way
that agents evaluate their strategies’ performance over time, we now turn to map-
ping these assessment scores to mixed strategies x ∈ X. To that end, a natural
choice would be for each agent to pick the strategy with the highest score via the
mapping
yk 7→ arg maxxk∈Xk
∑k
β xkβykβ (2.5)
Nevertheless, this “best response” approach carries several problems: First, if two
scores ykα and ykβ happen to be equal (e.g. if there are payoff ties), (2.5) becomes
a multi-valued mapping which requires a tie-breaking rule to be resolved (and is
theoretically quite cumbersome to boot). Additionally, such a practice could lead
to completely discontinuous trajectories of play in continuous time – for instance,
if the payoffs ukα are driven by an additive white Gaussian noise process, as is
commonly the case in information-theoretic applications of game theory; see e.g.
Altman et al. [1]. Finally, since best responding generically leads to pure strategies,
such a process precludes convergence of strategies to non-pure equilibria in finite
games.
To circumvent these obstacles, we will replace the arg max operator with the
regularized variant
Qk(yk) = arg maxxk∈Xk
{∑k
β xkβykβ − hk(xk)
}
, (2.6)
where hk : Xk → R is a smooth strongly convex function which acts as a penalty
(or “control cost”) to the maximization objective
∑k
β xkβykβ of player k.
2 Choice
models of this type are known in the literature as smooth best response maps (or
quantal response functions) and have seen extensive use in game-theoretic learning;
for a comprehensive account, see e.g. van Damme [40], McKelvey and Palfrey
[27], Fudenberg and Levine [11], Hofbauer and Sandholm [14], Sandholm [34] and
references therein. Formally, following Alvarez et al. [2], we have:
Definition 2.1. Let S be a finite set and let ∆ ≡ ∆(S) be the unit simplex spanned
by S. We will say that h : ∆→ R ∪ {+∞} is a penalty function on ∆ if:
(1) h is finite except possibly on the relative boundary bd(∆) of ∆.
(2) h is continuous on ∆, smooth on rel int(∆), and |dh(x)| → +∞ when x
converges to bd(∆).
(3) h is convex on ∆ and strongly convex on rel int(∆).
2Note here that this penalty mechanism is different than the penalty imputed to past payoff
observations in the performance assessment step (2.1): (2.1) discounts past instances of play
whereas (2.6) discourages the player from choosing pure strategies. Despite this fundamental
difference, these two processes end up being intertwined in the resulting learning scheme, so we
will use the term “penalty” for both mechanisms, irrespective of origin.
PENALTY-REGULATED DYNAMICS AND ROBUST LEARNING IN GAMES 7
We will also say that h is (regularly) decomposable with kernel θ if h(x) can be
written in the form:
h(x) =
∑
β∈S θ(xβ) (2.7)
where θ : [0,+1]→ R ∪ {+∞} is a continuous function such that
a) θ is finite and smooth on (0, 1].
b) θ′′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1].
c) limx→0+ θ′(x) = −∞ and limx→0+ θ′(x)/θ′′(x) = 0.
In this context, the map Q : RS → ∆ of (2.6) will be referred to as the choice map
(or smooth best response or quantal response function) induced by h.
Given that (2.6) allows us to view Q(ηy) = arg maxx∈∆{
∑
β xβyβ − η−1h(x)}
as a smooth approximation to the arg max operator in the limit η →∞ (i.e. when
the penalty term becomes negligible), the choice stage of our learning process will
consist precisely of the choice maps that are derived from penalty functions as
above; for simplicity of presentation however, our analysis will mostly focus on the
decomposable case.
In any event, Definition 2.1 will be central to our considerations, so some com-
ments are in order:
Remark 1. The fact that choice maps are well-defined and single-valued is an imme-
diate consequence of the convexity and boundary properties of h; the smoothness of
Q then follows from standard arguments in convex analysis – see e.g. Chapter 26 in
Rockafellar [32]. Moreover, the requirement limx→0+ θ′(x)/θ′′(x) = 0 of Definition
2.1 is just a safety net to ensure that penalty functions do not exhibit pathological
traits near the boundary bd(∆) of ∆. As can be easily seen, this growth condition
is satisfied by all of the example functions (2.8) below; in fact, to go beyond this
natural requirement, θ′′ must oscillate deeply and densely near 0.
Remark 2. Examples of penalty functions abound; some of the most prominent
ones are:
1. The Gibbs entropy: h(x) =
∑
β xβ log xβ . (2.8a)
2. The Tsallis entropy: h(x) = (1− q)−1∑β(xβ − xqβ), 0 < q ≤ 1. (2.8b)
3. The Burg entropy: h(x) = −∑β log xβ . (2.8c)
Strictly speaking, the Tsallis entropy is not well-defined for q = 1, but it approaches
the standard Gibbs entropy as q → 1, so we will use (2.8a) for q = 1 in that case.3
Example 1 (Logit choice). The most well-known example of a smooth best response
is the so-called logit map
Gα(y) =
exp(yα)∑
β exp(yβ)
, (2.9)
which is generated by the Gibbs entropy h(x) =
∑
β xβ log xβ of (2.8a). For uses
of this map in game-theoretic learning, see e.g. Cominetti et al. [9], Fudenberg
and Levine [11], Hofbauer and Sandholm [14], Hofbauer et al. [16], Leslie and
Collins [24], McFadden [26], Marsili et al. [25], Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [29],
Rustichini [33], Sorin [37] and many others.
3Actually, entropies are concave in statistical physics and information theory, but this detail
will not concern us here.
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Remark 3. Interestingly, McKelvey and Palfrey [27] provide an alternative deriva-
tion of (2.9) as follows: assume first that the score vector y is subject to additive
stochastic fluctuations of the form
y˜α = yα + ξα, (2.10)
where the ξα are independent Gumbel-distributed random variables with zero mean
and scale parameter ε > 0 (amounting to a variance of ε2pi2/6). It is then known
that the choice probability Pα(y) of the α-th action (defined as the probability that
α maximizes the perturbed variable y˜α) is just
Pα(y) ≡ P (y˜α = maxβ y˜β) = Gα(ε−1y). (2.11)
As a result, the logit map can be seen as either a smooth best response to the
deterministic penalty function h(x) or as a perturbed best response to the stochastic
perturbation model (2.10); furthermore, both models approximate the ordinary
best response correspondence when the relative magnitude of the perturbations
approaches 0. In a more general context, Hofbauer and Sandholm [14] showed
that this observation continues to hold even when the stochastic perturbations ξα
are not Gumbel-distributed but follow an arbitrary probability law with a strictly
positive and smooth density function: mutatis mutandis, the choice probabilities of
a stochastic perturbation model of the form (2.10) can be interpreted as a smooth
best response map induced by a deterministic penalty function in the sense of
Definition 2.1.
2.3. The dynamics of penalty-regulated learning. Combining the results of
the previous two sections, we will focus on the penalty-regulated learning process:
ykα(t) = ykα(0) e
−Tt +
∫ t
0
e−T (t−s)ukα(x(s)) ds,
xk(t) = Qk(yk(t)),
(PRL)
where ykα(0) represents the initial bias of player k towards action α ∈ Ak,4 T is
the model’s discount rate, and Qk : RAk → Xk is the smooth best response map of
player k (induced in turn by some player-specific penalty function hk : Xk → R).
From an implementation perspective, the difficulty with (PRL) is twofold: First,
it is not always practical to write the choice maps Qk in a closed-form expression
that the agents can use to update their strategies.5 Furthermore, even when this
is possible, (PRL) is a two-step, primal-dual process which does not allow agents
to update their strategies directly. The rest of this section will thus be devoted to
writing (PRL) as a continuous-time dynamical system on X that can be updated
with minimal computation overhead.
To that end, we will focus on decomposable penalty functions of the form
hk(xk) =
∑k
β
θk(xkβ), (2.12)
4The exponential decay of y(0) is perhaps best explained by the differential formulation (2.2)
for which y(0) is an initial condition; in words, the player’s initial bias simply dies out at the same
rate as a payoff observation at t = 0.
5The case of the Gibbs entropy is a shining (but, ultimately, misleading) exception to the
norm.
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where the kernels θk, k ∈ N, satisfy the convexity and steepness conditions of
Definition 2.1.6 In this context, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for
the maximization problem (2.6) give
ykα − θ′k(xkα) = ζk, (2.13)
where ζk is the Lagrange multiplier for the equality constraint
∑k
α xkα = 1.
7 By
differentiating, we then obtain:
y˙kα − θ′′k(xkα)x˙kα = ζ˙k, (2.14)
and hence, a little algebra yields:
x˙kα =
1
θ′′k(xkα)
[
y˙kα − ζ˙k
]
=
1
θ′′k(xkα)
[
ukα(x)− Tykα − ζ˙k
]
=
1
θ′′k(xkα)
[
ukα(x)− Tθ′k(xkα)−
(
ζ˙k + Tζk
)]
, (2.15)
where the second equality follows from the definition of the penalty-regulated
scheme (PRL) and the last one from the KKT equation (2.13). However, since∑k
α xkα = 1, we must also have
∑k
α x˙kα = 0; thus, summing (2.15) over α ∈ Ak
gives:
ζ˙k + Tζk = Θ
′′
k(xk)
∑k
β
1
θ′′k(xkβ)
[ukβ(x)− Tθ′k(xkβ)] , (2.16)
where Θ′′k denotes the harmonic aggregate:
8
Θ′′k(xk) =
[∑k
β
1/θ′′k(xkβ)
]−1
. (2.17)
In this way, by putting everything together, we finally obtain the penalty-regulated
dynamics
x˙kα =
1
θ′′k(xkα)
[
ukα(x)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑k
β
ukβ(x)
θ′′k(xkβ)
]
(PD)
− T
θ′′k(xkα)
[
θ′k(xkα)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑k
β
θ′k(xkβ)
θ′′(xkβ)
]
, (2.18)
Along with the aggregation-driven learning scheme (PRL), the dynamics (PD)
will be the main focus of our paper, so some remarks and examples are in order:
Example 2 (The Replicator Dynamics). As a special case, the Gibbs kernel θ(x) =
x log x of (2.8a) leads to the adjusted replicator equation
x˙kα = xkα
[
ukα(x)−
∑k
β
xkβukβ(x)
]
− T xkα
[
log xkα −
∑k
β
xkβ log xkβ
]
.
(RDT )
6Non-decomposable h can be treated similarly but the end expression is more cumbersome so
we will not present it.
7The complementary slackness multipliers for the inequality constraints xkα ≥ 0 can be omitted
because the steepness properties of θk ensure that the solution of (2.6) is attained in the interior
of the simplex.
8Needless to say, Θ′′h is not a second derivatives per se; we just use this notation for visual
consistency.
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As the name implies, when the discount rate T vanishes, (RDT ) freezes to the
ordinary (asymmetric) replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker [38]:
x˙kα = xkα
[
ukα(x)−
∑k
β
xkβukβ(x)
]
. (RD)
In this way, for T = 0, we recover the well-known equivalence between the replicator
dynamics and exponential learning in continuous time – for a more detailed treat-
ment, see e.g. Rustichini [33], Hofbauer et al. [16], Sorin [37] and Mertikopoulos
and Moustakas [29].
Remark 4 (Links with existing dynamics). Leslie and Collins [24] derived a dif-
ferential version of the penalty-regulated learning process (PRL) as the mean-field
dynamics of the Q-learning estimator (2.4); independently, Tuyls et al. [39] ob-
tained a variant of the strategy-space dynamics (PD) in the context of Q-learning
in 2-player games. A version of (PD) for 2-player games also appeared in Hopkins
[17] and Hopkins and Posch [18] as a perturbed reinforcement learning model; other
than that however, the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) appear to be new.
Interestingly, in terms of structure, the differential system (PD) consists of a
replicator-like term driven by the game’s payoffs, plus a game-independent adjust-
ment term which reflects the penalty imputed to past payoffs. This highlights a
certain structural similarity between (PD) and other classes of game dynamics with
comparable correction mechanisms: for instance, in a stochastic setting, Itô’s lemma
leads to a “second order in space” correction in the stochastic replicator dynamics
of Fudenberg and Harris [10], Cabrales [8], and Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [29];
likewise, such terms also appear in the “second order in time” approach of Laraki
and Mertikopoulos [20, 21].
The reason for this similarity is that all these models are first defined in terms
of a set of auxiliary variables: absolute population sizes in Fudenberg and Harris
[10] and Cabrales [8], and payoff scores in Laraki and Mertikopoulos [20] and here.
Differentiation of these “dual” variables with respect to time yields a replicator-like
term (which carries the dependence on the game’s payoffs) plus a game-independent
adjustment which only depends on the relation between these “dual” variables and
the players’ mixed strategies (the system’s “primal” variables).
Remark 5 (Well-posedness). Importantly, the dynamics (PD) are well-posed in the
sense that they admit unique global solutions for every interior initial condition
x(0) ∈ rel int(X). Since the vector field of (PD) is not Lipschitz, perhaps the
easiest way to see this is by using the integral representation (PRL) of the dynamics:
indeed, given that the payoff functions ukα are Lipschitz and bounded, the scores
ykα(t) will remain finite for all t ≥ 0, so interior solutions x(t) = Q(y(t)) of (PD)
will be defined for all t ≥ 0.
Moreover, even though the dynamics (PD) are technically defined only on the
relative interior of the game’s strategy space, the steepness and regularity require-
ments of Definition 2.1 allow us to extend the dynamics to the boundary bd(X) of
X by continuity (i.e. by writing 1/θ′′(xkα) = θ′(xkα)/θ′′(xkα) = 0 when xkα = 0).
By doing just that, every subface X′ of X will be forward invariant under (PD), so
the class of penalty-regulated dynamics may be seen as a subclass of the imitative
dynamics introduced by Björnerstedt and Weibull [4] (see also Weibull [41]).
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Remark 6 (Sharpened choices). In addition to tuning the discount rate of the learn-
ing scheme (PRL), players can also sharpen their smooth best response model by
replacing the choice stage (2.6) with
xk = Qk(ηkyk) (2.19)
for some ηk > 0. The choice parameters ηk may thus be viewed as (player-specific)
inverse temperatures: as ηk → ∞, the choice map of player k freezes down to the
arg max operator, whereas in the limit ηk → 0, player k will tend to mix actions
uniformly, irrespectively of their performance scores.
In this context, the same reasoning as before leads to the rate-adjusted dynamics:
x˙kα =
ηk
θ′′k(xkα)
[
ukα(x)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑k
β
ukβ(x)
θ′′k(xkβ)
]
(PDη)
− T
θ′′k(xkα)
[
θ′k(xkα)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑k
β
θ′k(xkβ)
θ′′(xkβ)
]
. (2.20)
We thus see that the parameters T and η play very different roles in (PDη): the
discount rate T affects only the game-independent penalty term of (PDη) whereas
ηk affects only the term which is driven by the game’s payoffs.
3. Long-run rationality analysis
In this section, our aim will be to analyze the asymptotic properties of the
penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) with respect to standard game-theoretic solution
concepts. Thus, in conjunction with the notion of Nash equilibrium, we will also
focus on the widely studied concept of quantal response equilibria:
Definition 3.1 (McKelvey and Palfrey [27]). Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game
and assume that each player k ∈ N is endowed with a quantal response function
Qk : RAk → Xk (cf. Definition 2.1). We will say that q = (q1, . . . , qN ) ∈ X is a
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of G with respect to Q (or a Q-equilibrium for
short) when, for some ρ ≥ 0 and for all k ∈ N:
qk = Qk (ρuk(q)) , (QRE)
where uk(q) = (ukα(q))α∈Ak ∈ RAk denotes here the payoff vector of player k.
More generally, we will say that q ∈ X is a restricted QRE of G if it is a QRE of
some restriction G′ of G.
The scale parameter ρ ≥ 0 will be called the rationality level of the QRE in
question. Obviously, when ρ = 0, QRE have no ties to the game’s payoffs; at the
other end of the spectrum, when ρ → ∞, quantal response functions approach
best responses and the notion of a QRE approximates smoothly that of a Nash
equilibrium. To see this in more detail, let q∗ ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium of G,
and let γ : U → X be a smooth curve on X defined on a half-infinite interval of
the form U = [a,+∞), a ∈ R. We will then say that γ is a Q-path to q∗ when
γ(ρ) is a Q-equilibrium of G with rationality level ρ and limρ→∞ γ(ρ) = q∗; in a
similar vein, we will say that q ∈ X is a Q-approximation of q∗ when q is itself
a Q-equilibrium and there is a Q-path joining q to q∗ (van Damme [40] uses the
terminology approachable).
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Figure 1. Phase portraits of the penalty-adjusted replicator dynamics
(RDT ) in a 2 × 2 potential game (Nash equilibria are depicted in dark red
and interior rest points in light/dark blue; for the game’s payoffs, see the ver-
tex labels). For high discount rates T  0, the dynamics fail to keep track
of the game’s payoffs and their only rest point is a global attractor which ap-
proaches the barycenter of X as T → +∞ (corresponding to a QRE of very
low rationality level). As the players’ discount rate drops down to the critical
value Tc ≈ 0.935, the globally stable QRE becomes unstable and undergoes
a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation (a phase transition) which results in the
appearance of two asymptotically stable QRE that approach the strict Nash
equilibria of the game as T → 0+.
Example 3. By far the most widely used specification of a QRE is the logit equilib-
rium which corresponds to the Gibbs choice map (2.9): in particular, we will say
that q ∈ X is a logit equilibrium of G when qkα = exp(ρukα(q))/
∑
β exp(ρukβ(q))
for all α ∈ Ak, k ∈ N.
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3.1. Stability analysis. We begin by linking the rest points of (PD) to the game’s
QRE:
Proposition 3.2. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game and assume that each player
k ∈ N is endowed with a quantal response function Qk : RAk → Xk Then:
(1) For T > 0, the rest points of the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) coincide
with the restricted QRE of G with rationality level ρ = 1/T .
(2) For T = 0, the rest points of (PD) are the restricted Nash equilibria of G.
Proof. Proof. Since the proposition concerns restricted equilibria, it suffices to
establish our assertion for interior rest points; given that the faces of X are forward-
invariant under the dynamics (PD), the general claim follows by descending to an
appropriate restriction G′ of G.
To wit, (PD) implies that any interior rest point q ∈ rel int(X) will have ukα(q)−
Tθ′k(qkα) = ukβ(q)−Tθ′k(qkβ) for all α, β ∈ Ak and for all k ∈ N. As such, if T = 0,
we will have ukα(q) = ukβ(q) for all α, β ∈ Ak, i.e. q will be a Nash equilibrium
of G; otherwise, for T > 0, a comparison with the KKT conditions (2.13) implies
that q is the (unique) solution of the maximization problem:
qk = arg maxxk∈Xk
{∑k
β
xkβukβ(xk; q−k)− Thk(xk)
}
= arg maxxk∈Xk
{∑k
β
xkβ · T−1ukβ(xk; q−k)− hk(xk)
}
= Qk
(
T−1uk(q)
)
,
(3.1)
i.e. q is a Q-equilibrium of G with rationality level ρ = 1/T . 
Proposition 3.2 shows that the discount rate T of the dynamics (PD) plays a dou-
ble role: on the one hand, it determines the discount rate of the players’ assessment
phase (2.2), so it reflects the importance that players give to past observations; on
the other hand, T also determines the rationality level of the rest points of (PD),
measuring how far the stationary points of the players’ learning process are from
being Nash. That being said, stationarity does not capture the long-run behavior
of a dynamical system, so the rest of our analysis will be focused on the asymptotic
properties of (PD). To that end, we begin with the special case of potential games
where the players’ payoff functions are aligned along a potential function in the
sense of (1.2); in this context, the game’s potential function is “almost” increasing
along the solution orbits of (PD) if T is small enough:
Lemma 3.3. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game with potential U and assume that
each player k ∈ N is endowed with a decomposable penalty function hk : Xk → R.
Then, the function
F (x) ≡ T
∑
k∈N
hk(xk)− U(x) (3.2)
is Lyapunov for the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD): for any interior orbit x(t) of
(PD), we have ddtF (x(t)) ≤ 0 with equality if and only if x(0) is a QRE of G.
Proof. Proof. By differentiating F , we readily obtain:
∂F
∂xkα
= Tθ′k(xkα)− ukα(x), (3.3)
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where θk is the kernel of the penalty function of player k and we have used the
potential property (1.2) of G to write ∂U∂xkα = ukα. Hence, for any interior orbit
x(t) of (PD), some algebra yields:
dF
dt
=
∑
k
∑k
α
∂F
∂xkα
x˙kα
= −
∑
k
∑k
α
1
θ′′(xkα)
(Tθ′k(xkα)− ukα(x))2
+
∑
k
Θ′′k(xk)
[∑k
α
1
θ′′k(xkα)
(Tθ′k(xkα)− ukα(x))
]2
= −
∑
k
1
Θ′′k(xk)
[∑k
α
pikαw
2
kα −
(∑k
α
pikαwkα
)2]
, (3.4)
where we have set pikα = Θ′′k(xkα)/θ
′′
k(xkα) and wkα = Tθ
′
k(xkα) − ukα(x). Since
pikα ≥ 0 and
∑k
α pikα = 1 by construction, our assertion follows by Jensen’s inequal-
ity (simply note that the condition wkα = wkβ for all α, β ∈ Ak is only satisfied at
the QRE of G). 
Needless to say, Lemma 3.3 can be easily extended to orbits lying in any subface
X′ of X by considering the game’s restricted QRE. Indeed, given that the restricted
QRE of G that are supported in a subface X′ of X coincide with the local minimizers
of F |X′ , Lemma 3.3 gives:
Proposition 3.4. Let x(t) be a solution orbit of the penalty-regulated dynamics
(PD) for a potential game G. Then:
(1) For T > 0, x(t) converges to a restricted QRE of G with the same support
as x(0).
(2) For T = 0, x(t) converges to a restricted Nash equilibrium with support
contained in that of x(0).
Proposition 3.4 implies that interior solutions of (PD) for T > 0 can only con-
verge to interior points in potential games; as we show below, this behavior actually
applies to any finite game:
Proposition 3.5. Let x(t) be an interior solution orbit of the penalty-regulated
dynamics (PD) for T > 0. Then, any ω-limit of x(t) is interior; in particular, the
boundary bd(X) of X repels all interior orbits.9
Proof. Proof. Our proof will be based on the integral representation (PRL) of the
penalty-regulated dynamics (PD). Indeed, with ukα bounded on X (say by some
M > 0), we get:
|ykα(t)| ≤ |ykα(0)| e−Tt +
∫ t
0
e−T (t−s) |ukα(x(s))| ds
≤ |ykα(0)| e−Tt + M
T
(
1− e−Tt) , (3.5)
so any ω-limit of (PRL) must lie in the rectangle CT =
∏
k C
T
k where C
T
k = {yk ∈
RAk : |ykα| ≤ M/T}. However, since Qk maps RAk to rel int(Xk) continuously,
9Of course, orbits that start on bd(X) will remain in bd(X) for all t ≥ 0.
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Qk(C
T
k ) will be a compact set contained in rel int(Xk), and our assertion follows by
recalling that x(t) = Q(y(t)). 
The above highlights an important connection between the score variables ykα
and the players’ mixed strategy shares xkα: the asymptotic boundedness of the
scores implies that the solution orbits of (PD) will be repelled by the boundary
bd(X) of the game’s strategy space. On the other hand, this connection is not
a two-way street because the smooth best response map Qk : RAk → Xk is not a
diffeomorphism: Qk(y) = Qk(y + c(1, . . . , 1)) for every c ∈ R, so Qk collapses the
directions that are parallel to (1, . . . , 1).
To obtain a diffeomorphic set of score-like variables, let Ak = {αk,0, αk,1, . . . }
denote the action set of player k and consider the relative scores:
zkµ = θ
′
k(xkµ)− θ′k(xk,0) = ykµ − yk,0, µ = 1, 2, . . . , (3.6)
where the last equality follows from the KKT conditions (2.13). In words, zkµ
simply measures the score difference between the µ-th action of player k and the
“flagged” 0-th action; as such, the evolution of zkµ over time will be:
z˙kµ = y˙kµ − y˙k,0 = ukµ − Tykµ − (uk,0 − Tyk,0) = ∆ukµ − Tzkµ, (3.7)
where ∆ukµ = ukµ − uk,0. In particular, these relative scores remain unchanged if
a players’ payoffs are offset by the same amount, a fact which is reflected in the
following:
Lemma 3.6. Let Ak,0 = Ak \ {αk,0} = {αk,1, αk,2, . . . }. Then, with notation as
above, the map ιk : xk 7→ zk is a diffeomorphism from rel int(Xk) to RAk,0 .
Proof. Proof. We begin by showing that ιk is surjective. Indeed, let zk ∈ RAk,0
and set yk = (0, zk,0, zk,1, . . . ). Then, if xk = Qk(yk), the KKT conditions (2.13)
become −θ′k(xk,0) = ζk and zkµ − θ′k(xkµ) = ζk for all µ ∈ Ak,0. This gives
zkµ = θ
′
k(xkµ)− θ′k(xk,0) for all µ ∈ Ak,0, i.e. ιk is onto.
Assume now that θ′k(xkµ) − θ′k(xkµ) = θ′k(x′kµ) − θ′k(x′k,0) for some xk, x′k ∈
rel int(Xk). A trivial rearrangement gives θ′k(xkα) − θ′k(x′kα) = θ′k(xkβ) − θ′k(x′kβ)
for all α, β ∈ Ak, so there exists some ξk ∈ R such that θ′k(x′kα) = ξk + θ′k(xkα)
for all α ∈ Ak. With θ′k strictly increasing, this implies that x′kα > xkα (resp.
x′kα < xkα, resp. x
′
kα = xkα) for all α ∈ Ak if ξk > 0 (resp. ξk < 0, resp. ξk = 0).
However, given that the components of xk and x′k both sum to 1, we must have
x′kα = xkα for all α i.e. the map xk 7→ zk is injective.
Now, treating xk,0 = 1 −
∑
µ∈Ak,0 xkµ as a dependent variable, the Jacobian
matrix of ιk will be:
Jkµν =
∂zkµ
∂xkν
= θ′′k(xkµ)δµν + θ
′
k
(
1−∑µ∈Ak,0 xkµ) . (3.8)
Then, letting θ′′kµ = θ
′′
k(xkµ) and θ
′′
k,0 = θ
′
k
(
1−∑kµ xkµ), it is easy to see that Jkµν
is invertible with inverse matrix
Jµνk =
δµν
θ′′kµ
− Θ
′′
k
θ′′kµθ
′′
kν
, (3.9)
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where Θ′′k =
(∑
α∈Ak 1/θ
′′
kα
)−1. Indeed, dropping the index k for simplicity, a
simple inspection gives:∑
ν 6=0
JµνJ
νρ =
∑
ν 6=0
(
θ′′µδµν + θ
′′
0
) · (δνρ/θ′′ν −Θ′′/(θ′′νθ′′ρ ))
=
∑
ν 6=0
(
θ′′µδµνδνρ/θ
′′
ν + θ
′′
0 δνρ/θ
′′
ν − θ′′µΘ′′δµν/(θ′′νθ′′ρ )− θ′′0 Θ′′/(θ′′νθ′′ρ )
)
= δµρ + θ
′′
0/θ
′′
ρ −Θ′′/θ′′ρ − θ′′0 Θ′′
∑
ν 6=0
1
/
(θ′′νθ
′′
ρ ) = δµρ. (3.10)
The above shows that ιk is a smooth immersion; since ιk is bijective, it will also be
a diffeomorphism by the inverse function theorem, and our proof is complete. 
With this diffeomorphism at hand, we now show that the penalty-regulated
dynamics (PD) are contracting if T > 0 (a result which ties in well with Proposition
3.5 above):
Proposition 3.7. Let K0 ⊆ rel int(X) be a compact set of interior initial conditions
and let Kt = {x(t) : x(0) ∈ K0} be its evolution under the dynamics (PD). Then,
there exists a volume form Vol on rel int(X) such that
Vol(Kt) = Vol(K0) exp(−TA0t), (3.11)
where A0 =
∑
k(card(Ak) − 1). In other words, the penalty-regulated dynamics
(PD) are incompressible for T = 0 and contracting for T > 0.
Proof. Proof. Our proof will be based on the relative score variables zkµ of (3.6).
Indeed, let U0 be an open set of
∏
k R
Ak,0 and let Wkµ = ∆ukµ(x) − Tzkµ denote
the RHS of (3.7). Liouville’s theorem then gives
d
dt
Vol0(Ut) =
∫
Ut
divW dΩ0, (3.12)
where dΩ0 =
∧
k,µ dzkµ is the ordinary Euclidean volume form on
∏
k R
Ak,0 , Vol0
denotes the associated (Lebesgue) measure on
∏
k R
Ak,0 and Ut is the image of U0 at
time t under (3.7). However, given that ∆ukµ does not depend on zk (recall that ukµ
and uk,0 themselves do not depend on xk), we will also have
∂Wkµ
∂zkµ
= −T . Hence,
summing over all µ ∈ Ak,0 and k ∈ N, we obtain divW = −
∑
k(card(Ak)− 1)T =
−A0T and (3.12) yields Vol(Ut) = Vol(U0) exp(−A0Tt).
In view of the above, let ι = (ι1, . . . , ιN ) : rel int(X)→
∏
k R
Ak,0 be the product
of the “relative score” diffeomorphisms of Lemma 3.6, and let Vol = ι∗Vol0 be the
pullback of the Euclidean volume Vol0(·) on
∏
k R
Ak,0 to rel int(X), i.e. Vol(K) =
Vol0(ι(K)) for any (Borel) K ⊆ rel int(X). Then, letting U0 = ι(K0), our assertion
follows from the volume evolution equation above and the fact that ι(x(t)) solves
(3.7) whenever x(t) solves (PD). 
When applied to (RDT ) for T = 0, Proposition 3.7 yields the classical result
that the asymmetric replicator dynamics (RD) are incompressible – and thus do
not admit interior attractors (Hofbauer and Sigmund [15], Ritzberger and Weibull
[31]).10 We thus see that incompressibility characterizes a much more general class
10This does not hold in the symmetric case because the symmetrized payoff uα(x) depends on
xα.
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of dynamics: in our learning context, it simply reflects the fact that players weigh
their past observations uniformly (neither discounting, nor reinforcing them).
That said, in the case of the replicator dynamics, we have a significantly clearer
picture regarding the stability and attraction properties of a game’s equilibria; in
particular, the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund
[15]) states that:11
(1) If an interior trajectory converges, its limit is Nash.
(2) If a state is Lyapunov stable, then it is also Nash.
(3) A state is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
By comparison, in the context of the penalty-regulated game dynamics (PD),
we have:
Theorem 3.8. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game, let hk : Xk → R be a decom-
posable penalty function for each player k ∈ N, and let Qk : RAk → Xk denote each
player’s choice map. Then, the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) have the following
properties:
(1) For T > 0, if q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable then it is also a QRE of G; moreover,
if q is a Q-approximate strict Nash equilibrium and T is small enough, then
q is also asymptotically stable.
(2) For T = 0, if q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable, then it is also a Nash equilibrium of
G; furthermore, q is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash
equilibrium of G.
Proof. Proof. Our proof will be broken up in two parts depending on the discount
rate T of (PD):
The case T > 0. Let T > 0 and assume that q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable (and, hence,
stationary). Clearly, if q is interior, it must also be a QRE of G by Proposition 3.2,
so there is nothing to show. Suppose therefore that q ∈ bd(X); then, by Proposition
3.5, we may pick a neighborhood U of q in X such that cl(U) does not contain any
ω-limit points of the interior of X under (PD). However, since q is Lyapunov stable,
any interior solution that is wholly contained in U must have an ω-limit in cl(U),
a contradiction.
Regarding the asymptotic stability of Q-approximate strict equilibria, assume
without loss of generality that q∗ = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0) is a strict Nash equilibrium of
G and let q ≡ q(T ) ∈ X be a Q-approximation of q∗ with rationality level ρ = 1/T .
Furthermore, let Wkµ = ∆ukµ−Tzkµ and consider ∆ukµ as a function of only x`µ,
µ ∈ A`,0, by treating x`,0 = 1 −
∑
µ x`µ as a dependent variable. Then, as in the
proof of Lemma 3.6, a simple differentiation yields:
∂Wkµ
∂z`ν
∣∣∣∣
q
=

−T if ` = k, ν = µ,
0 if ` = k, ν 6= µ,∑
ρ∈A`,0 J
νρ
` (q)
∂
∂w`ρ
∆ukµ otherwise,
(3.13)
where Jνρ` (q) denotes the inverse Jacobian matrix (3.9) of the map x 7→ z evaluated
at q.
11Recall that q ∈ X is said to be Lyapunov stable (or stable) when for every neighborhood U of
q in X, there exists a neighborhood V of q in X such that if x(0) ∈ V then x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0;
q is called attracting when there exists a neighborhood U of q in X such that limt→∞ x(t) = q if
x(0) ∈ U ; finally, q is called asymptotically stable when it is both stable and attracting.
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We will show that all the elements of (3.13) with ` 6= k or µ 6= ν are of order
o(T ) as T → 0+, so (3.13) is dominated by the diagonal elements ∂Wkµ∂zkµ = −T for
small T . To do so, it suffices to show that T−1Jνρ` → +∞ as T → 0+; however,
since q is a Q-approximation of the strict equilibrium q∗ = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0), we will
also have qkµ ≡ qkµ(T ) → q∗kµ = 0 and qk,0 → q∗k,0 = 1 as T → 0+. Moreover,
recalling that q is a QRE of G with rationality level ρ = 1/T , we will also have
∆ukµ(q) = Tθ
′(qkµ)−Tθ′(qk,0), implying in turn that Tθ′(qkµ(T ))→ ∆ukµ(q∗) < 0
as T → 0+. We thus obtain:
1
Tθ′′(qkµ(T ))
=
θ′(qkµ(T ))
θ′′(qkµ(T ))
1
Tθ′(qkµ(T ))
→ 0
∆ukµ(q∗)
= 0, (3.14)
and hence, on account of (3.9) and (3.14), we will have Jνρ` = o(T ) for small T .
By continuity, the eigenvalues of (3.13) evaluated at q ≡ q(T ) will all be negative if
T > 0 is small enough, so q will be a hyperbolic rest point of (3.7); by the Hartman-
Grobman theorem it will then also be structurally stable, and hence asymptotically
stable as well.
The case T = 0. For T = 0, let q be Lyapunov stable so that every neighborhood U
of q in X admits an interior orbit x(t) that stays in U for all t ≥ 0; we then claim that
q is Nash. Indeed, assume ad abusrdum that αk,0 ∈ supp(q) has uk,0(q) < ukµ(q)
for some µ ∈ Ak,0 ≡ Ak \ {αk,0}, and let U be a neighborhood of q such that xk,0 >
qk,0/2 and ∆ukµ(x) ≥ m > 0 for all x ∈ U . Picking an orbit x(t) that is wholly
contained in U , the dynamics (3.7) readily give zkµ(t) ≥ zk,0(0) +mt, implying in
turn that zkµ(t) → +∞ as t → ∞. However, with zkµ = θ′(xkµ)− θ′(xk,0), this is
only possible if xkµ(t)→ 0, a contradiction.
Assume now that q = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G. To show
that q is Lyapunov stable, it will be again convenient to work with the relative
scores zkµ and show that if m ∈ R is sufficiently negative, then every trajectory
z(t) that starts in the open set Um = {z ∈
∏
k R
Ak,0 : zkµ < m} always stays in Um;
since Um maps via ι−1 :
∏
k R
Ak,0 → rel int(X) to a neighborhood of q in rel int(X),
this is easily seen to imply Lyapunov stability for q in X.
In view of the above, pick m ∈ R so that ∆ukµ(x(z)) ≤ −ε < 0 for all z ∈ Um
and let τm = inf{t : z(t) /∈ Um} be the time it takes z(t) to escape Um. Then, if τm
is finite and t ≤ τm, the relative score dynamics (3.7) readily yield
zkµ(t) = zkµ(0)+
∫ t
0
∆ukµ(Q0(z(s)))ds ≤ zkµ(0)−εt < m for all µ ∈ Ak,0, k ∈ N.
(3.15)
Thus, substituting τm for t in (3.15), we obtain a contradiction to the definition of
τm and we conclude that z(t) always stays in Um if m is chosen negative enough –
i.e. q is Lyapunov stable.
To show that q is in addition attracting, it suffices to let t → ∞ in (3.15) and
recall the definition (3.6) of the zkµ variables. Finally, for the converse implication,
assume that q is not pure; in particular, assume that q lies in the relative interior of
a non-singleton subface X′ spanned by supp(q). Proposition 3.7 shows that q cannot
attract a relatively open neighborhood U ′ of initial conditions in X′ because (PD)
remains volume-preserving when restricted to any subface X′ of X. This implies
that q cannot be attracting in X, so q cannot be asymptotically stable either. 
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In conjunction with our previous results, Theorem 3.8 provides an interesting
insight into the role of the dynamics’ discount rate T : for small T > 0, the dy-
namics (PD) are attracted to the interior of X and can only converge to points
that are approximately Nash; on the other hand, for T = 0, the solutions (PD)
are only attracted to strict Nash equilibria (see also Fig. 1). As such, Theorem 3.8
and Proposition 3.4 suggest that if one seeks to reach a (pure) Nash equilibrium,
the best convergence properties are provided by the “no discounting” case T = 0.
Nonetheless, as we shall see in the following section, if one seeks to implement the
dynamics (PD) as a bona fide learning algorithm in discrete time, the “positive
discounting” regime T > 0 is much more robust than the “no disounting” case – all
the while allowing players to converge arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium.
3.2. The case T < 0: reinforcing past observations. In this section, we ex-
amine briefly what happens when players use a negative discount rate T < 0, i.e.
they reinforce past observations instead of discounting them. As we shall see, even
though the form of the dynamics (PRL)/(PD) remains the same (the derivation
of (PRL) and (PD) does not depend on the sign of T ), their properties are quite
different in the regime T < 0.
The first thing to note is that the definition of a QRE also extends to negative
rationality levels ρ < 0 that describe an “anti-rational” behavior where players
attempt to minimize their payoffs: indeed, the QRE of a game G ≡ G(N,A, u) for
negative ρ are simply QRE of the opposite game −G ≡ (N,A,−u), and as ρ→ −∞,
these equilibria approximate the Nash equilibria of −G.
In this way, repeating the analysis of Section 3.1, we obtain:
Theorem 3.9. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game and assume that each player
k ∈ N is endowed with a decomposable penalty function hk : Xk → R with induced
choice map Qk : RAk → Xk. Then, in the case of a negative discount rate T < 0:
(1 ) The rest points of the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) are the restricted QRE
of the opposite game −G.
(2 ) The dynamics (PD) are expanding with respect to the volume form of Proposi-
tion 3.7 and (3.11) continues to hold.
(3 ) A strategy profile q ∈ X is asymptotically stable if and only if it is pure (i.e. a
vertex of X); any other rest point of (PD) is unstable.
Theorem 3.9 will be our main result for T < 0, so some remarks in order:
Remark 7. The games G and −G have the same restricted equilibria, so the rest
points of (PD) for small T > 0 (corresponding to QRE with large ρ = 1/T → +∞)
transition smoothly to perturbed equilibria with small T < 0 (ρ → −∞) via the
“fully rational” case T = 0 (which corresponds to the Nash equilibria of the game
when ρ = ±∞). In fact, by continuity, the phase portrait of the dynamics (PD) for
sufficiently small T (positive or negative) will be broadly similar to the base case
T = 0 (at least, in the generic case where there are no payoff ties in G). The main
difference between positive and negative discount rates is that, for small T < 0,
the orbits of (PD) are attracted to the vertices of X (though each individual vertex
might have a vanishingly small basin of attraction), whereas for small T > 0, the
dynamics are only attracted to interior points (which, however, are arbitrarily close
to the vertices of X).
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Figure 2. Phase portraits of the penalty-adjusted replicator dynamics
(RDT ) showing the transition from positive to negative discount rates in the
game of Fig. 1. For small T > 0, the rest points of (PD) are Q-approximate
Nash equilibria (red dots), and they attract almost all interior solutions; as T
drops to negative values, the non-equilibrium vertices of X become asymptoti-
cally stable (but with a small basin of attraction), and each one gives birth to
an unstable QRE of the opposite game in a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation.
Of these two equilibria, the one closer to the game’s interior Nash equilibrium
is annihilated with the pre-existing QRE at T ≈ −0.278, and as T → −∞, we
obtain a time-inverted image of the T → +∞ portrait with the only remaining
QRE repelling all trajectories towards the vertices of X; Figure 2(b) shows the
case where only one (repelling) rest point remains.
Remark 8. It should be noted that the expanding property of (PD) for T < 0 does
not clash with the fact that the vertices of X are asymptotically stable. Indeed,
as can be easily seen by Lemma 3.6, sets of unit volume become vanishingly small
(in the Euclidean sense) near the boundary bd(X) of X; as such, the expanding
property of the dynamics (PD) precludes the existence of attractors in the interior
of X, but not of boundary attractors.12
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.9. The time inversion t 7→ −t in (PD) is equivalent to
the inversion u 7→ −u, T 7→ −T , so our first claim follows from the T > 0 part of
Proposition 3.2; likewise, our second claim is obtained by noting that the proof of
Proposition 3.7 does not differentiate between positive and negative temperatures
either.
For the last part, our proof will be based on the dynamics (3.7); more precisely,
focus for convenience on the vertex q = (α1,0, . . . , αN,0) of X, and let Ak,0 =
Ak \ {αk,0} as usual. Then, a simple integration of (3.7) yields
zkµ(t) = zkµ(0)e
−Tt +
∫ t
0
e−T (t−s)∆ukµ(x(s)) ds. (3.16)
12Obviously, the same applies to every subface X′ of X, explaining in this way why only the
vertices of X are attracting.
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However, given that ∆ukµ is bounded on X (say by some M > 0), the last integral
will be bounded in absolute value by M |T |−1 (e|T |t − 1), and hence:
zkµ(t) ≤ −M |T |−1 +
(
zkµ(0) +M |T |−1
)
e|T |t. (3.17)
Thus, if we pick zkµ(0) < −M |T |−1, we will have limt→∞ zkµ(t) = −∞ for all
µ ∈ Ak,0, k ∈ N, i.e. x(t) → q. Accordingly, given that the set UT = {z ∈∏
k R
Ak,0 : zkµ < −M |T |−1} is just the image of a neighborhood of q in rel int(X)
under the diffeomorphism of Lemma 3.6, q will attract all nearby interior solutions
of (PD); by restriction, this property applies to any subface of X which contains q,
so q is attracting. Finally, if zkµ(0) < −M |T |−1, we will also have zkµ(t) < zkµ(0)
for all t ≥ 0 (cf. the proof of Proposition 3.5), so q is Lyapunov stable, and hence
asymptotically stable as well.
Conversely, assume that q ∈ X is a non-pure Lyapunov stable state; then, by
descending to a subface of X if necessary, we may assume that q is interior. In
that case, if U is a neighborhood of q in rel int(X), Proposition 3.7 shows that any
neighborhood V of q that is contained in U will eventually grow to a volume larger
than that of U under (PD), so there is no open set of trajectories contained in U .
This shows that only vertices of X can be stable, and our proof is complete. 
4. Discrete-time learning algorithms
In this section, we examine how the dynamics (PRL) and (PD) may be used
for learning in finite games that are played repeatedly over time. To that end, a
first-order Euler discretization of the dynamics (PRL) gives the recurrence
Ykα(n+ 1) = Ykα(n) + γ [ukα(X(n))− TYkα(n)] ,
Xk(n+ 1) = Q(Yk(n+ 1)),
(4.1)
which is well-known to track (PRL) arbitrarily well over finite time horizons when
the discretization step γ is sufficiently small. That said, in many practical scenar-
ios, players cannot monitor the mixed strategies of their opponents, so (4.1) cannot
be updated directly. As a result, in the absence of perfect monitoring (or a simi-
lar oracle-like device), any distributed discretization of the dynamics (PRL)/(PD)
should involve only the players’ observed payoffs and no other information.
In what follows (cf. Table 1 for a summary), we will drop such information
and coordination assumptions one by one: in Algorithm 1, players will only be
assumed to possess a bounded, unbiased estimate of their actions’ payoffs; this
assumption is then dropped in Algorithm 2 which only requires players to observe
their in-game payoffs (or a perturbed version thereof); finally, Algorithm 3 provides
a decentralized variant of Algorithm 2 where players are no longer assumed to
update their strategies in a synchronous way.
4.1. Stochastic approximation of continuous dynamics. We begin by recall-
ing a few general elements from the theory of stochastic approximation. Following
Benaïm [3] and Borkar [6], let S be a finite set, and let Z(n), n ∈ N, be a stochastic
process in RS such that
Z(n+ 1) = Z(n) + γn+1U(n+ 1), (4.2)
where γn is a sequence of step sizes and U(n) is a stochastic process in RS adapted to
the filtration F of Z. Then, given a (Lipschitz) continuous vector field f : RS → RS,
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Input Uncertainties Asynchronicities
Algorithm 1 payoff vector X no
Algorithm 2 in-game payoffs X no
Algorithm 3 in-game payoffs X X
Table 1. Summary of the information and coordination requirements of the
learning algorithms of Section 4.
we will say that (4.2) is a stochastic approximation of the dynamical system
z˙ = f(z), (MD)
if E [U(n+ 1) | Fn] = f(Z(n)) for all n. More explicitly, if we split the so-called
innovation term U(n) of (4.2) into its average value f(Z(n)) = E[U(n+ 1)|Fn] and
a zero-mean noise term V (n+ 1) = U(n+ 1)− f(Z(n)), (4.2) takes the form
Z(n+ 1) = Z(n) + γn+1 [f(Z(n)) + V (n+ 1)] , (SA)
which is just a noisy Euler-like discretization of (MD); conversely, (MD) will be
referred to as the mean dynamics of the stochastic recursion (SA).
The main goal of the theory of stochastic approximation is to relate the process
(SA) to the solution trajectories of the mean dynamics (MD). Some standard
assumptions that enable this comparison are:
(A1) The step sequence γn is (`2−`1)–summable, viz.
∑
n γn =∞ and
∑
n γ
2
n <∞.
(A2) V (n) is a martingale difference with supn E
[
‖V (n+ 1)‖2
∣∣∣ Fn] <∞.
(A3) The stochastic process Z(n) is bounded: supn ‖Z(n)‖ <∞ (a.s.).
Under these assumptions, the next lemma provides a sufficient condition which
ensures that (SA) converges to the set of stationary points of (MD):
Lemma 4.1. Assume that the dynamics (MD) admit a strict Lyapunov function
(i.e. a real-valued function which decreases along non-stationary orbits of (MD))
such that the set of values taken by this function at the rest points of (MD) has
measure zero in R. Then, under Assumptions (A1)–(A3) above, every limit point of
the stochastic approximation process (SA) belongs to a connected set of rest points
of the mean dynamics (MD).
Proof. Proof. Our claim is a direct consequence of the following string of results
in Benaïm [3]: Prop. 4.2, Prop. 4.1, Theorem 5.7, and Prop. 6.4. 
As an immediate application of Lemma 4.1, let G be a finite game with potential
U . By Lemma 3.3, the function F = Th−U is Lyapunov for (PRL)/(PD); moreover,
since U is multilinear and h is smooth and strictly convex, Sard’s theorem (Lee [22])
ensures that the set of values taken by F at its critical points has measure zero.
Thus, any stochastic approximation of (PRL)/(PD) which satisfies Assumptions
(A1)–(A3) above can only converge to a connected set of restricted QRE.
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4.2. Score-based learning. In this section, we present an algorithmic implemen-
tation of the score-based learning dynamics (PRL) under two different information
assumptions: first, we will assume that players possess an unbiased estimate for the
payoff of each of their actions (including those that they did not play at a given
instance); we will then drop this assumption and describe the issues that arise when
players can only observe their in-game payoffs.
4.2.1. Learning with imperfect payoff estimates. If the players can estimate the
payoffs of actions that they did not play, the sequence of play will be as follows:
(1) At stage n + 1, each player selects an action αk(n + 1) ∈ Ak based on a
mixed strategy Xk(n) ∈ Xk.
(2) Every player receives a bounded and unbiased estimate uˆkα(n + 1) of his
actions’ payoffs, viz.
(a) E [uˆkα(n+ 1) | Fn] = ukα(X(n)),
(b) |uˆkα(n+ 1)| ≤ C (a.s.),
where Fn is the history of the process up to stage n and C > 0 is a constant.
(3) Players choose a mixed strategy Xk(n+ 1) ∈ Xk and the process repeats.
It should be noted here that players are not explicitly assumed to monitor their
opponents’ strategies, nor to communicate with each other in any way: for instance,
in congestion and resource allocation games, players can compute their out-of-game
payoffs by probing the game’s facilities for a broadcast. That said, the specifics of
how such estimates can be obtained will not concern us here: in what follows, we
only seek to examine how players can exploit such information when it is available.
To that end, the score-based learning process (PRL) gives:
Algorithm 1 Score-based learning with imperfect payoff monitoring
n← 0;
foreach player k ∈ N do
initialize Yk ∈ RAk and set Xk ← Qk(Yk); # initialization
Repeat
n← n+ 1;
foreach player k ∈ N do simultaneously
select new action αk ∈ Ak according to mixed strategy Xk; # choose action
foreach player k ∈ N do
foreach action α ∈ Ak do
observe uˆkα; # estimate payoff of each action
Ykα ← Ykα + γn(uˆkα − TYkα); # update score of each action
Xk ← Qk(Yk); # update mixed strategy
until termination criterion is reached
To study the convergence properties of Algorithm 1, let Yk(n) denote the score
vector of player k at the n-th iteration of the algorithm – and likewise for the
player’s mixed strategy Xk(n) ∈ Xk, chosen action αk(n) ∈ Ak and payoff estimates
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uˆkα(n) ∈ R. Then, for all k ∈ N and α ∈ Ak, we get:
E [(Ykα(n+ 1)− Ykα(n))/γn+1 | Fn] = E [uˆkα(n+ 1) | Fn]− TYkα(n)
= ukα(X(n))− TYkα(n). (4.3)
Together with the choice rule Xk(n) = Qk(Yk(n)), the RHS of (4.3) yields the score
dynamics (PRL), so the process X(n) generated by Algorithm 1 is a stochastic
approximation of (PRL). We thus get:
Theorem 4.2. Let G be a potential game. If the step size sequence γn satisfies
(A1) and the players’ payoff estimates uˆkα are bounded and unbiased, Algorithm 1
converges (a.s.) to a connected set of QRE of G with rationality parameter ρ = 1/T .
In particular, X(n) converges within ε(T ) of a Nash equilibrium of G and the error
ε(T ) vanishes as T → 0.
Proof. Proof. In view of the discussion following Lemma 4.1, we will establish our
claim by showing that Assumptions (A1)–(A3) are all satisfied in the case of the
stochastic approximation
Ykα(n+ 1) = Ykα(n) + γn+1 [uˆkα(n+ 1)− TYkα(n)] . (4.4)
Assumption (A1) is true by design, so there is nothing to show. Furthermore,
expressing the noise term of (4.4) as Vkα(n+1) = uˆkα(n+1)−ukα(X(n)), we readily
obtain E [Vkα(n+ 1) | Fn] = 0 and E
[
V 2kα(n+ 1)
∣∣ Fn] ≤ 2C2, so Assumption (A2)
also holds. Finally, with uˆkα bounded (a.s.), Ykα will also be bounded (a.s.): indeed,
note first that 0 ≤ 1−Tγn ≤ 1 for all n larger than some n0; then, using the uniform
norm for convenience of notation, the iterates of (4.4) will satisfy ‖Y (n+ 1)‖ ≤
(1− Tγn+1) ‖Y (n)‖+ γn+1C for all sufficiently large n. Hence:
(1) If ‖Y (n)‖ ≤ C/T , we will also have ‖Y (n+ 1)‖ ≤ (1 − Tγn+1)C/T +
γn+1C = C/T .
(2) If ‖Y (n)‖ > C/T , we will have ‖Y (n+ 1)‖ ≤ ‖Y (n)‖ − Tγn+1 ‖Y (n)‖ +
γn+1C ≤ ‖Y (n)‖, i.e. ‖Y ‖ decreases.
The above shows that ‖Y (n)‖ is bounded by T−1C ∨maxn≥n0 ‖Y (n)‖, so Assump-
tion (A3) also holds. By Proposition 3.2 and the discussion following Lemma 4.1, we
then conclude that X(n) converges to a connected set of restricted QRE of G. How-
ever, since Y (n) is bounded, X(n) will be bounded away from the boundary bd(X)
of X because the image of a compact set under Q is itself compact in rel int(X). As
such, any limit point of X(n) will be interior and our claim follows. 
4.2.2. The issue with in-game observations. Assume now that the only information
at the players’ disposal is the payoff of their chosen actions, possibly perturbed by
some random noise process. Formally, if αk(n+ 1) denotes the action of player k at
the (n+ 1)-th stage of the process, we will assume that the corresponding observed
payoff is of the form
uˆk(n+ 1) = uk(α1(n+ 1), . . . , αN (n+ 1)) + ξk(n+ 1), (4.5)
where the noise process ξk is a bounded, F-adapted martingale difference (i.e.
E [ξk(n+ 1) | Fn] = 0 and ‖ξk‖ ≤ C for some C > 0) with ξk(n + 1) indepen-
dent of αk(n+ 1).13
13These assumptions are rather mild and can be easily justifed by invoking the independence
between the nature-driven perturbations to the players’ payoffs and the sampling done by each
player to select an action at each stage. In fact, this accounts not only for i.i.d. perturbations
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In this context, players only possess information regarding the actions that they
actually played. Thus, motivated by the Q-learning scheme (2.4), we will use the
unbiased estimator
uˆkα(n+1) = uˆk(n+1)· 1(αk(n+ 1) = α)P (αk(n+ 1) = α | Fn) = 1(αk(n+1) = α)·
uˆk(n+ 1)
Xkα(n)
(4.6)
which allows us to replace the inner action-sweeping loop of Algorithm 1 with the
update step:
foreach player k ∈ N do simultaneously
select new action αk ∈ Ak according to mixed strategy Xk; # choose action
observe uˆk; # receive realized payoff
Ykαk ← Ykαk + γn(uˆk − TYkαk)/Xkαk ; # update current action score
Xk ← Q(Yk); # update mixed strategy
As before, Y (n) is an F-adapted process with
E
[
(Ykα(n+ 1)− Ykα(n))/γn+1
∣∣Fn]
= E
[
1(αk(n+ 1) = α) · uˆk(n+ 1)
Xkα(n)
∣∣∣∣ Fn]− TYkα(n)
= ukα(X(n))− TYkα(n), (4.7)
where the last line follows from the assumptions on uˆk and ξk.
The mean dynamics of (4.7) are still given by (PRL) so the resulting algorithm
boils down to the Q-learning scheme of Leslie and Collins [24]. This scheme was
shown to converge to a QRE (or Nash distribution) in several classes of 2-player
games under the assumption that Y (n) remains bounded, but since the probabilities
Xkα(n) can become arbitrarily small, this assumption is hard to verify – so the
convergence of this variant of Alg. 1 with in-game observations cannot be guaranteed
either.
One possible way of overcoming the unboundedness of Y (n) would be to truncate
the innovation term of (4.4) with a sequence of expanding bounds as in Sharia [36];
ultimately however, the required summability conditions amount to showing that
the estimator (4.6) is itself bounded, so the original difficulty remains.14 Thus,
instead of trying to show that Y (n) tracks (PRL), we will focus in what follows on
the strategy-based variant (PD) – which is equivalent to (PRL) in continuous time
– and implement it directly as a payoff-based learning process in discrete time.
4.3. Strategy-based learning. In this section, we will derive an algorithmic im-
plementation of the penalty-regulated dynamics (PD) which only requires players
to observe their in-game payoffs – or a perturbed version thereof. One advantage
of using (PD) as a starting point is that it does not require a closed form expres-
sion for the choice map Q (which is hard to obtain for non-logit action selection);
(a case which has attracted significant interest in the literature by itself), but also for scenarios
where the noise at stage n+ 1 depends on the entire history of play up to stage n.
14Note that this is also true for the weaker requirement of Borkar [6], namely that the innova-
tion term of (4.4) is bounded in L2 by K(1 + ‖Yn‖2) for some positive K > 0.
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another is that since the algorithm is strategy-based (and hence its update vari-
ables are bounded by default), we will not need to worry too much about satisfying
conditions (A2) and (A3) as in the case of Algorithm 1.
With all this in mind, we obtain the following strategy-based algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Strategy-based learning with in-game payoff observations
Parameters: T > 0, θk, γn
n← 0;
foreach player k ∈ N do
initialize Xk ∈ rel int(Xk) as a mixed strategy with full support; # initialization
Repeat
n← n+ 1;
foreach player k ∈ N do simultaneously
select new action αk ∈ Ak according to mixed strategy Xk; # choose action
observe uˆk; # receive realized payoff
foreach action α ∈ Ak do
Xkα ← Xkα + γn
θ′′k (Xkα)
[
uˆk
Xkαk
(
1(αk = α)− Θ
′′
k(Xk)
θ′′k (Xkαk )
)
− Tgkα(X)
]
where gkα(x) ≡ θ′k(xkα)−Θ′′k(xk)
∑k
β θ
′
k(Xkβ)
/
θ′′k (Xkβ); # update mixed strategy
until termination criterion is reached
Remark 1. As a specific example, the Gibbs kernel θ(x) = x log x leads to the
update rule:
Xkα ← Xkα + γn
[(
1(αk = α)−Xkα
) · uˆk − TXkα (logXkα −∑kβ Xkβ logXkβ)] .
(4.8)
Thus, for T = 0, we obtain the reinforcement learning scheme of Sastry et al. [35]
based on the classical replicator equation (RD).
The strategy update step of Algorithm 2 has been designed to track the dynamics
(PD); indeed, for all k ∈ N and for all α ∈ Ak, we will have
E [(Xkα(n+ 1)−Xkα(n))/γn+1 | Fn]
=
1
θ′′k(Xkα(n))
[
ukα(X(n))
(
1− Θ
′′
k(Xk(n))
θ′′k(Xkα(n))
)
−
∑k
β 6=α ukβ(X(n))
Θ′′k(Xk(n))
θ′′k(Xkβ(n))
]
− Tgkα(X(n))
θ′′k(Xkα(n))
, (4.9)
which is simply the RHS of (PD) evaluated at X(n). On the other hand, unlike
Algorithm 1 (which evolves in
∏
k R
Ak), Algorithm 2 is well-defined only if the
iterates Xk(n) are admissible mixed strategies with full support at each update
step.
To check that this is indeed the case, note first that the second term of the strat-
egy update step of Algorithm 2 vanishes when summed over α ∈ Ak so
∑k
αXkα(n)
will always be equal to 1 (recall that Xk(0) is initialized as a valid probability distri-
bution); as a result, it suffices to show that Xkα(n) > 0 for all α ∈ Ak. Normalizing
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the game’s payoffs to [0, 1] for simplicity, the next lemma shows that the iterates of
Alg. 2 for T > 0 remain a bounded distance away from the boundary bd(X) of X:
Lemma 4.3. Let θ be a penalty function (cf. Definition 2.1) with xθ′′(x) ≥ m > 0
for all x > 0. Then, for normalized payoff observations uˆk ∈ [0, 1] and T > 0, there
exists a positive constant K > 0 (depending only on T and θ) such that the iterates
Xkα(n) of Algorithm 2 remain bounded away from 0 whenever the step sequence γn
is bounded from above by K.
Proof. Proof. We begin with some simple facts for θ (for simplicity, we will drop
the player index k ∈ N in what follows):
• θ′ is strictly increasing.
• There exists some M > 0 such that |θ′(ξ)/θ′′(ξ)| < M for all ξ ∈ (0, 1).
• For all x ∈ X, ∑β 1/θ′′(xβ) ≥ maxβ 1/θ′′(xβ), so Θ′′(x) ≤ minβ θ′′(xβ) ≤
max{θ′′(ξ) : card(A)−1 ≤ ξ ≤ 1}. In particular, there exists some Θ′′max
such that 0 < Θ′′(x) ≤ Θ′′max for all x ∈ X.
Now, letting αˆ be the chosen action at step n + 1 and writing uˆ for the corre-
sponding observed payoff, we will have:
1
θ′′(xα)
[
Tgα(x)− uˆ
xαˆ
(
1(αˆ = α)−Θ′′h(x)/θ′′(xαˆ)
)]
≤ 1
θ′′(xα)
[
Tgα(x) +
uˆΘ′′(x)
xαˆθ′′(xαˆ)
]
≤ 1
θ′′(xα)
[
T
(
θ′(xα)−Θ′′(x)
∑k
β θ
′(xβ)
/
θ′′(xβ)
)
+m−1Θ′′(x)
]
≤ 1
θ′′(xα)
[
Tθ′(xα) + Θ′′max
(
m−1 + card(A)MT
)]
,
where we used the normalization uˆ ∈ [0, 1] in the first two lines. We thus get
Xα(n+ 1) ≥ Xα(n)− γn+1Xα(n)c1θ
′(Xα(n)) + c2
θ′′(Xα(n))
, (4.10)
where c1 and c2 are positive constants.
Since θ′ is strictly increasing, we will have c1θ′(x) + c2 < 0 if and only if x < ψ0
for some fixed ψ0 ∈ (0, 1) which depends only on T and θ. As such, if Xα(n) ≤ ψ0,
(4.10) gives Xα(n + 1) > Xα(n); on the other hand, if Xα(n) ≥ ψ0, then, the
coefficient of γn+1Xα(n) in (4.10) will be bounded from above by some positive
constant c > 0 (recall that xθ′′(x) ≥ m > 0 for all x > 0 and limx→0+ θ′(x)/θ′′(x) =
0). Therefore, if we take K ≡ 1/(2c) and γn+1 ≤ K for all n ≥ 0, we readily obtain:
Xα(n+ 1) ≥ Xα(n)− cγn+1Xα(n) ≥ 12Xα(n) ≥ 12ψ0, (4.11)
and hence:
Xα(n+ 1) ≥
{
Xα(n) if Xα(n) ≤ ψ0,
1
2ψ0 if Xα(n) ≥ ψ0.
(4.12)
We thus conclude that Xα(n) ≥  ≡ min{Xα(1), 12ψ0} > 0, and our proof is
complete. 
Under the assumptions of Lemma 4.3 above, Algorithm 2 remains well-defined
for all n ≥ 0 and the players’ action choice probabilities never become arbitrarily
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small.15 With this in mind, the following theorem shows that Algorithm 2 converges
to a connected set of QRE in potential games:
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a potential game and let θ be a penalty function with
xθ′′(x) ≥ m for some m > 0. If the step size sequence γn of Algorithm 2 satis-
fies (A1) and the players’ observed payoffs uˆk are of the form (4.5), Algorithm 2
converges (a.s.) to a connected set of QRE of G with rationality level ρ = 1/T .
Corollary 4.5. With the same assumptions as above, Algorithm 2 with Gibbs up-
dating given by (4.8) converges within ε(T ) of a Nash equilibrium; furthermore, the
error ε(T ) vanishes as T → 0.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.4. Thanks to Lemma 4.3, Assumptions (A2) and (A3)
for the iterates of Algorithm 2 are verified immediately – simply note that the
innovation term of the strategy update step is bounded by the constantK of Lemma
4.3. Thus, by Lemma 4.1 and the subsequent discussion, X(n) will converge to
a connected set of restricted QRE of G. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.3, the
algorithm’s iterates will always lie in a compact set contained in the relative interior
of X, so any limit point of the algorithm will also be interior and our assertion
follows. 
Remark 2. Importantly, Theorem 4.4 holds for any T > 0, so Algorithm 2 can
be tuned to converge arbitrarily close to the game’s Nash equilibria (see also the
discussion following Theorem 3.8 in Section 3). In this way, Theorem 4.4 is different
in scope than the convergence results of Cominetti et al. [9] and Bravo [7]: instead
of taking high T > 0 to guarantee a unique QRE, players converge arbitrarily close
to a Nash equilibrium by taking small T > 0.
Remark 3. In view of the above, one might hope that Algorithm 2 converges to
the game’s (strict) Nash equilibria for T = 0. Unfortunately however, even in the
simplest possible case of a single player game with two actions, Lamberton et al.
[19] showed that the replicator update model (4.8) with T = 0 and step sizes of
the form γn = 1/nr, 0 < r < 1, converges with positive probability to the game’s
globally suboptimal state.
4.4. The robustness of strategy-based learning. Even though Algorithm 2
only requires players to observe and record their in-game payoffs, it still hinges on
the following assumptions:
(1) Players all update their strategies at the same time.
(2) There is no delay between playing and receiving payoffs.
Albeit relatively mild, these assumptions are often violated in practical scenarios:
for instance, the decision of a wireless user to transmit or remain silent in a slotted
ALOHA network is not synchronized between users, so updates and strategy revi-
sions occur at different periods for each user – for a more detailed discussion, see
15In practice, it might not always be possible to obtain an absolute bound on the observed
payoffs of the game (realized, estimated or otherwise). In that case, Lemma 4.3 cannot be applied
directly, but Algorithm 2 can adapt dynamically to the magnitude of the game’s payoffs by
artificially projectings its iterates away from the boundary of the simplex – for a detailed account
of this technique, see e.g. pp. 115–116 in Leslie [23].
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(a) Initial distribution of strategies (n = 0).
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(b) Distribution after n = 2 iterations.
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(c) Distribution after n = 5 iterations.
H0, 0L
H3, 1L
H1, 3L
H0, 0L
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(d) Distribution after n = 10 iterations.
Figure 3. Snapshots of the evolution of of Algorithm 2. In our simulations,
we drew 104 random initial strategies in the potential game of Fig. 1 and,
for each strategy allocation, we ran the Gibbs variant of Algorithm 2 with
discount rate T = 0.2 and step sequence γn = 1/(5 + n0.6). In each figure,
the shades of gray represent the normalized density of states at each point of
the game’s strategy space; we also drew the phase portraits of the underlying
mean dynamics (PD) for convenience. We see that Algorithm 2 converges to
the game’s QRE (which, for T = 1/ρ = 0.2 are very close to the game’s strict
equilibria) very fast: after only n = 10 iterations, more than 99% of the initial
strategies have converged within ε = 10−3 of the game’s equilibria.
e.g. Altman et al. [1]. Furthermore, in the same scenario, message propagation de-
lays often mean that the outcome of a user’s choice does not depend on the choices
of other users at the current timeslot, but on their previous choices.
In view of all this, we will devote the rest of this section to examining the
robustness of Algorithm 2 in this more general, asynchronous setting. To that end,
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let Rn ⊆ 2N be the random set of players who update their strategies at the n-th
iteration of the algorithm. Of course, since players are not aware of the global
iteration counter n, they will only know the number of updates that they have
carried out up to time n, as measured by the random variables φk(n) ≡ card{m ≤
n : k ∈ Rm}, k ∈ N. Accordingly, the asynchronous variant of Algorithm 2 that
we will consider consists of replacing the instruction “for each player k ∈ N” by “for
each player k ∈ Rn” and replacing “n” by “φk(n)” in the step-size computation.
Another natural extension of Algorithm 2 consists of allowing the realized payoffs
perceived by the players to be subject to delays (as well as stochastic perturbations).
Formally, let dj,k(n) denote the (integer-valued) lag between player j and player k
when k plays at stage n. Then, the observed payoff uˆk(n+ 1) of player k at stage
n+ 1 will depend on his opponents’ past actions, and we will assume that
E [uˆk(n+ 1) | Fn] = uk (X1(n− d1,k(n)), . . . , Xk(n), . . . , XN (n− dN,k(n))) .
(4.13)
For instance, if the payoff that player k observes at stage n is of the form
uˆk(n) = uk(α1(n− d1,k(n)), . . . , αk(n), . . . , αN (n− dN,k(n))) + ξk(n), (4.14)
where ξk(n) is a zero-mean perturbation process as in (4.5), it is easy to check that
the more general condition (4.13) also holds.
In light of the above, we may derive a decentralized variant of Algorithm 2 as
follows: first, assume that each player k ∈ N is equipped with a discrete event
timer τk(n), n ∈ N, representing the times at which player k wishes to update his
strategies; assume further that n/τk(n) ≥ c > 0 for all n ∈ N so that player k keeps
updating at a positive rate. Then, if t denotes a global counter that runs through
the set of update times T =
⋃
k{τk(n) : n ∈ N}, the corresponding revision set at
time t ∈ T will be Rt = {k : τk(n) = t for some n ∈ N}. In this way, we obtain
the following distributed implementation of Algorithm 2, stated for simplicity with
logit action selection in mind (viz. θ(x) = x log x):
Algorithm 3 Strategy-based learning with asynchronous in-game observations
Parameters: T > 0, θk, γn
n← 0;
Initialize Xk ∈ rel int(Xk) as a mixed strategy with full support; # initialization
Repeat
Event Play occurs at time τk(n+ 1) ∈ T;
n← n+ 1;
select new action αk according to mixed strategy Xk; # current action
observe uˆk; # receive realized payoff
foreach action α ∈ Ak do
Xkα ← Xkα
+ γn
[(
1(αk = α)−Xkα
) · uˆk − TXkα (logXkα −∑kβ Xkβ logXkβ)]
# update mixed strategy
until termination criterion is reached
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Following Chapter 7 of Borkar [6], we will make the following assumptions for
Algorithm 3:
(1) The step sequence is of the form γn = K/n, where K is a positive constant
small enough to guarantee that Algorithm 3 remains well-defined for all n
(cf. Lemma 4.3).
(2) The strategy revision process Rn is a homogeneous ergodic Markov chain
over 2N; in particular, if µ is its (necessarily unique) stationary distribution,
the asymptotic update rate of player k will be λk =
∑
A⊆N µ(A)1(k ∈ A) =∑
A⊆N:k∈A µ(A).
(3) The delay processes dj,k(n) are bounded (a.s.): this condition ensures that
delays become negligible as time steps are aggregated.
These assumptions can actually be weakened further at the expense of simplicity –
for a more general treatment, see e.g. Borkar [6]. Still and all, we have:
Proposition 4.6. Under the previous assumptions, the conclusions of Theorem 4.4
still hold for the iterates of Algorithm 3 with asynchronous updates and delayed
payoffs.
Proof. Proof. By Theorems 2 and 3 in Chap. 7 of Borkar [6], it is easy to see that
Algorithm 3 represents a stochastic approximation of the rate-adjusted dynamics
x˙k = λkPD(xk), (4.15)
where λk is the mean rate at which player k updates her strategy and PD(xk)
denotes the RHS of the rate-adjusted dynamics (PD). In general, the revision
rate λk is time-dependent (leading to a non-autonomous dynamical system), but
given that the revision process Rn is a homogeneous ergodic Markov chain, λk
will be equal to the (constant) probability of including player k at the revision
set Rn at the n-th iteration of the algorithm. These dynamics have the same rest
points as (PD) and an easy calculation (cf. the proof of Lemma 3.3) shows that
F (x) = T
∑
k hk(xk)−U(x) is also Lyapunov for (4.15). The proof of Theorem 4.4
then goes through essentially unchanged. 
4.5. Discussion. We conclude this section by discussing some features of Algo-
rithms 2 and 3:
• First, both algorithms are highly distributed. The information needed to
update each player’s strategies is the payoff of each player’s chosen action,
so there is no need to be able to assess the performance of alternate strategic
choices (including monitoring other players’ actions). Additionally, there
is no need for player updates to be synchronized: as shown in Section 4.4,
each player can update his strategies independently of others.
• The discount rate T = − log λ should be positive in order to guarantee con-
vergence. Smaller values yield convergence to QRE that are very close to the
game’s Nash equilibria; on the other hand, such a choice also impacts con-
vergence speed because the step sequence has to be taken commensurately
small (for instance, note that the step-size bound of Lemma 4.3 is roughly
proportional to the dynamics’ discount rate). As such, tuning the discount
rate T will usually require some problem-dependent rules of thumb; regard-
less, our numerical simulations suggest that Algorithm 2 converges within
a few iterations even for small discount values (cf. Fig. 3).
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